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Robert Anderton and Paul Hiebert 
 
Abstract 
The general acceleration of trade globalisation over the last decade –or a growing interdependence of 
economies via trade, production and financial market linkages– has engendered several macroeconomic 
implications for the euro area. This paper focuses on assessing the key impacts on the euro area 
macroeconomy through an analysis of prospective channels, stylised facts and review of relevant empirical 
findings. It takes a long-term perspective over a period predominantly characterised by the rapid growth of 
globalisation, nothwithstanding the more recent interruption to the growth of global trade and capital flows 
that emerged towards the end of 2008 associated with the global financial turmoil and the associated 
downturn in global economic activity. Following an overview of the salient aspects of globalisation, which 
highlights the increasing openness of the euro area in terms of both trade and capital flows as well as the 
global reduction in transportation and information costs and the rise in the effective global supply of labour, 
the paper then assesses the external impacts of globalisation on the euro area, focussing on trade 
performance, export specialisation and import prices. It then investigates euro area domestic adjustment to 
globalisation with a supply-side focus, analysing separately impacts on productivity, labour markets and 
prices. 
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 Non-technical summary 
With a growing interdependence of economies via trade, production and financial market linkages, 
globalisation has become an increasingly important phenomenon over the last decade, notwithstanding the 
more recent interruption to the growth of global trade and capital flows that emerged towards the end of 2008 
associated with the global financial turmoil and the downturn in global economic activity. Indeed, these recent 
events demonstrate how the increased international interconnectedness of financial and product markets 
exacerbated the financial turmoil that began in mid-2007, while the rapid growth in “vertical specialisation” 
and widespread global production chains associated with globalisation contributed to the subsequent highly 
synchronised nature of the downturn in global trade at the end of 2008.   
In this paper, we focus on two aspects of the longer-term trends of globalisation. First, we show how 
globalisation has increased export competition in world markets over the past decade due to the emergence 
of new global trade players such as China, resulting in the shrinking of export market shares of advanced 
industrialised economies such as the euro area, while simultaneously stimulating world demand and euro 
area activity. The loss in share partly depends on how similar the export product specialisation of the euro 
area compares to these new competitors, with evidence showing that China is rapidly moving away from 
labour-intensive products and recently becoming similar to the euro area by increasing its specialisation in 
more research-intensive goods. On the imports side, globalisation has been accompanied in the euro area by 
a higher share of imports of manufactured goods from low-cost countries, which has resulted in stronger 
growth of extra-euro area imports relative to intra-euro area trade, while also putting downward pressure on 
import prices and inflationary pressures. Meanwhile, this downward pressure had been partly offset by higher 
demand for commodities from low-cost countries resulting in high commodity import prices – which had 
increased significantly up until the second half of 2008 prior to declining on average since that time in the 
context of the downturn in global economic activity.         
Second, the paper focuses on globalisation and its prospective role in shaping three broad areas of the euro 
area macroeconomy: productivity, the labour market, and prices. On the whole, the balance of empirical 
evidence suggests that globalisation alone may have had limited directly measurable aggregate impacts, but 
its role in shaping domestic developments remains nonetheless significant for two reasons. First, 
globalisation has had pronounced discernible impacts on certain areas of the economy. Second, the 
phenomenon of globalisation is intertwined with several other ongoing structural changes, such as 
technological change and its diffusion and macroeconomic policy formulation. In particular: 
•  Globalisation has a strong role to play in boosting productivity through facilitating total factor 
productivity spillovers across economies and boosting innovation in response to competitive 
pressures. However, euro area productivity has been weak at the aggregate level over the last 
decade despite growing international openness. A more detailed sectoral analysis indicates that this 
weakness has derived to a large extent from areas of the economy which are more sheltered from 
international competition, thereby hinting at a role for policies aiming at enhancing openness to such 
forces.  
•  Globalisation’s impacts on euro area labour markets have been mainly visible in the form of a 
redistribution of employment across sectoral, occupational and skill categories. The rise in offshoring 
which characterises the recent phase of globalisation appears to have been associated with a clear 
skill bias in labour demand. As real wages across skill categories have shown little differentiation in 
response to this, labour market adjustment associated with such a bias has been concentrated on 
 employment. That said, there has been limited change in income inequality in the euro area when 
comparing with other advanced economies, such as the UK or US, thus far. Moreover, job losses 
associated with offshoring have been limited as a proportion of overall job losses in the euro area 
economy and, importantly, offset by employment gains elsewhere. In this vein, globalisation’s 
contribution to an extended period of wage moderation within the euro area (for instance, through 
offshoring or the threat of offshoring) may very well have contributed to the strong job creation 
witnessed over the last decade. At the same time, the pronounced fall in the euro area wage share of 
income over the last decades appears to be linked not only to globalisation but to other possibly 
more relevant (though potentially related) factors such as technological and structural change.  
•  Globalisation appears to have had a small dampening effect on euro area prices on average over the 
5 to 10 years leading up to around 2005 as strong relative price shocks associated with low prices of 
imports of manufactured goods through global supply developments on balance offset strong 
increases in prices of hard commodities resulting from heightened global demand pressures. While a 
rise in international competitive pressures may have also contributed to wage moderation in the euro 
area as a whole, it appears to have led to little compression on overall profit mark-ups of firms. 
However, as in the case of productivity, exposure to international competition plays an important role 
in sectoral mark-up developments. Beyond these effects, compelling evidence of a growing role for 
global measures of slack in the inflation process of the euro area and other advanced economies 
remains absent. Ultimately, then, the extent to which globalisation affects euro area inflation in the 
short term depends importantly on both the net effect of relative price shocks (relating to further 
changes in import shares and terms of trade developments, in addition to the strength an persistence 
of dynamics in commodity prices) along with the influence of competitive forces in driving down costs 
and firm markups.  
 
  




With a growing interconnectedness of economies through trade, production and 
financial market channels, globalisation has become an increasingly important 
phenomenon over the last decade. Indeed, more recently, the increased integration of 
economies across the globe in both financial and product markets related to the rapid 
growth of globalisation has also been associated with global financial turmoil and the 
highly internationally synchronised nature of the most recent global economic 
downturn. However, taking a longer-term perspective, what distinguishes the rapid 
growth of globalisation over the past decade has not been falling transport costs or 
tariffs alone –a process which has been ongoing for decades now– but rather new 
production paradigms enabled by both an expansion of global productive capacity and 
major technological changes facilitating the access and transfer of goods, services, 
people and knowledge across borders. In this sense, this latest acceleration of 
globalisation has been inextricably linked to technological change (and, accordingly, 
distinguishing between the impact of these two phenomena in practice is very 
difficult).  
The rapidly changing world implied by these forces seems to have influenced a range 
of developments in advanced and emerging economies alike. This paper takes a 
narrow view and focuses exclusively on gauging the macroeconomic impacts for the 
euro area though in practice, globalisation has undoubtedly also had several other 
equally important implications – notably for financial markets and macroeconomic 
policies. The paper takes a long-term perspective over a period predominantly 
characterised by the rapid growth of globalisation, notwithstanding the more recent 
interruption to the growth of global trade and capital flows that emerged towards the 
end of 2008 associated with the global financial turmoil and the associated downturn 
in global economic activity. Following an overview of the salient aspects of 
globalisation, which highlights the increasing openness of the euro area in terms of 
both trade and capital flows as well as the global reduction in transportation and   2
information costs and the rise in the effective global supply of labour, this note then 
assesses the external impacts of globalisation on the euro area, focussing on trade 
performance, export specialisation and import prices. It then moves to assess euro area 
domestic adjustment with a supply-side focus, analysing separately impacts on 
productivity, labour markets and prices.
1 
 
2  OVERVIEW OF KEY ASPECTS GLOBALISATION   
Globalisation, if narrowly defined as growing trade openness in response to falling 
trade and transport costs, has been ongoing for decades and in this sense is not a novel 
phenomenon. Over most of the last decade, however, this process appears to have 
accelerated, with a rapid rise across the globe in import volumes (Figure 1), which 
more than doubled for the euro area since the early 1990s. But more precisely defined, 
globalisation is the rapidly growing interconnectedness of economies also through   
production and financial market linkages and channels, with two broad factors 
underlying such a development. First, falling costs of transporting not only goods, but 
also services and information across borders (Figure  2) has led to changes in the 
production processes, most notably related to the international fragmentation of 
production.  As pointed out by Baldwin (2006), while a “first unbundling” (or a 
decreasing necessity of making goods close to the point of consumption given falling 
transportation costs) has been ongoing for many decades, a “second unbundling” (or a 
decreasing necessity of performing the different stages of the production process 
geographically close to one another given falling communication and coordination 
costs) has more recently extended the first unbundling. 
 
                                                 
1   The analysis of domestic euro area impacts of trade globalisation in this paper draws considerably from the 
analysis of Hiebert and Pula (2008).    3
Figure 1.  Imports in industrialised countries  
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Source: IMF World Economic Outlook and ECB calculations 
 




















Tarriffs in OECD countries 
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Source: Price and Cournède (2007). 
Note: Tariffs are median of national mean bound tariffs for OECD countries; sea freight is average international freight charges 
per tonne; passenger air transport is average airline revenue per passenger mile/US import air passenger fares; international 
calls is cost of a three-minute call from New York to London; costs of processing information is cost of computing an average 
operation (sum and multiplication). 
 
Second, there has been a large expansion in global productive capacity on account of the 
rapidly increasing integration of emerging economies in international trade and production 
(Figure  3). These emerging market economies are frequently characterised as “low-cost” 
economies given their relatively lower labour cost levels when compared with advanced   4
economies such as the euro area. In particular, estimates of hourly compensation costs for the 
manufacturing sector as a whole suggest significantly lower labour costs of economies in 




Figure 3.  Export-weighted labour force by region 
(Index, 1980 = 100) 
Figure 4.  Hourly compensation costs for production 
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Source: Jaumotte and Tytell (2007). 
Note: Export-weighted labour force computed as national labour force 
scaled by export-to-GDP ratios. 
Source: US Bureau of Labor Statistics. 
Note: Data for China refers to costs for all employees (data for other 
countries only refer to production workers); coverage may also differ. 
 
The economic globalisation brought about by these changes has been one of the major trends 
shaping the world economy in recent years. On the real side, international trade has expanded 
substantially, particularly with China and other emerging Asian economies as well as the new 
EU Member States.
3 Trade volumes have also increased strongly for the euro area, with 
export and import volumes continually and rapidly outpacing the growth of GDP over 
the past quarter of a century (Figure 5).  
 
                                                 
2    It should be noted that there are several important caveats regarding measurement, for example, the composition of 
manufacturing within each country obviously affects aggregate remuneration and therefore influences hourly labour costs.  
3    For a comprehensive assessment of the euro area’s international performance, see di Mauro and Anderton (2007), Baumann 
and di Mauro (2006), ESCB (2005) and Anderton et al. (2004).    5
Figure 5.  Extra-euro area exports and imports as 
percentage of GDP 
 (Index: 2000=100; quarterly data; volume terms) 
Figure 6. Euro area foreign assets and liabilities 



























Note: The last observation refers to the third quarter of 2008.  Source: ECB calculations based on Balance of Payments data. 
 
On the financial side, global international capital flows have increased even more rapidly than 
trade in goods and services, resulting in substantial increases in holdings of international 
assets and liabilities across the globe. A similar story holds for the euro area over the last 
decade, where the ongoing strength of capital flows is particularly reflected in the stock of 
outward and inward foreign direct investment which has virtually doubled as a percentage of 
GDP since 1999 (Figure 6). One summary index of economic globalisation, produced by the 
KOF Swiss Economic Institute, has increased substantially in the euro area in the years 
leading up to 2000 and has continued to stand considerably above the level of a comparable 











FDI Equity Fixed income Loans/Deposits
1999 2007  6
Figure 7.  Summary measure of economic globalisation, euro area 













Source: KOF Swiss Economic Institute. 
Note: Euro area 16 obtained using 2007 GDP weights. Summary economic globalisation 
measure obtained on the basis of a weighted measure constructed using actual flows  
(trade flows, foreign direct investment flows and stocks, portfolio investment and income 
payments to foreign nationals) as well as hidden import barriers (mean tariff rate, taxes on 
international trade, and capital account restrictions). 
 
The paper takes a long-term perspective over a period characterised by the rapid growth of 
globalisation, although there has been a more recent reversal of the growth of global trade and 
capital flows that started towards the end of 2008 associated with the global financial turmoil 
and global downturn. This paper therefore outlines the longer-term general impacts of the 
growth in trade globalisation on the euro area macroeconomy in four areas: on trade 
developments and competitiveness, productivity and the supply side of the economy, labour 
market effects, and implications for price determination. In general, the above changes in the 
global economic landscape would be expected to have wide-ranging impacts on 
macroeconomic developments across the globe. In the long run, increased trade openness 
along with other associated factors such as technological gains would be expected to benefit 
both advanced as well as emerging economies through more efficient resource allocation, 
lower prices, more product choice, welfare gains from deepening specialisation and, 
ultimately, higher living standards. In the short run, however, this process likely embeds some 
adjustment costs and distributional effects associated with sectoral reallocation of production 
and associated inputs. Indeed, globalisation –as with any other profound structural change– 
entails distributional aspects which may imply simultaneously significant costs for some as   7
well as considerable benefits for others. But such distributional aspects are only one part of 
the macroeconomic implications as economies refocus on areas of higher comparative 
advantage and, ultimately, lead to aggregate welfare gains. In this context, globalisation has 
implied domestic macroeconomic adjustment for advanced economies in several areas.  
This paper complements existing work on the topic of globalisation and its impacts on 
advanced economies,
4 focusing specifically on providing an overall assessment focused on the 
recent euro area macroeconomic experience. To this end, this paper provides an examination 
of several stylised facts and empirical evidence to assess the role of globalisation in shaping 
euro area macroeconomic developments to date, drawing conclusions where possible. Indeed, 
drawing firm conclusions on the basis of observed outcomes is difficult in that the recent 
wave of globalisation has come in the context of several (not totally independent) other 
structural changes, such as EMU and the ongoing impacts of the launch of the euro; the 
worldwide rapid pace of technological change, and several policy changes.  
 
3  Globalisation and euro area trade and competitiveness 
 
The emergence of global trade players such as China, other than causing an increase in world 
trade and boosting euro area exports, has brought about a reduction in export market shares of 
advanced industrialised economies such as the euro area. Such losses in share are to a certain 
extent automatic and may not be problematic if they reflect the ongoing re-organisation of 
world production in line with comparative advantage. However, the extent of the loss in share 
may be connected to the export product specialisation of the euro area and how it compares to 
these new competitors and whether it is changing appropriately over time. On the imports 
side, globalisation has implied a drastic shift towards imports from low-cost countries. This 
has involved imports of consumer goods, as well as intermediate imports - the latter related to 
the internationalisation of production – which has impacts on real domestic variables as well 
as prices.  
                                                 
4   Several studies –such as Dreher et al (2008), Mishkin (2007), Price and Cournède (2007), Helbling et al. 
(2006), European Commission (2006), and the Federal Reserve Bank of Kansas City (2006)– have all analysed 
various aspects of globalisation and macroeconomic developments in advanced economies.    8
3.1 Exports and competitiveness 
In examining euro area exports, it would appear that major economies are losing export 
market share, while China has been gaining share. Against the background of the emergence 
of low-income countries as major players in world trade, export volume market shares of 
advanced industrialised countries – such as the euro area, USA, UK and Japan - have fallen in 
recent years, while the shares of countries such as China have dramatically increased (Figure 
8). Given these developments, it may not be surprising that the losses in export shares 
occurring across a variety of advanced industrialised countries cannot be fully explained by 
changes in price competitiveness (in particular, export share equations for the euro area need a 
negative time trend in addition to the usual competitiveness term in order to capture 
movements in extra-euro area export volumes).
 5  Nevertheless, despite the declines in export 
market share, extra-export volumes of the euro area were growing rapidly as a percentage of 
GDP due to the persistently robust growth in foreign demand until the end of 2008. Given that 
these favourable global demand conditions also seem to be at least partly driven by 
globalisation forces, this positive impact on exports has more than offset the dampening effect 
on exports of the loss in share. 
Figure 8.  Export market shares 
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Source: IMF, Eurostat and ECB calculations. 
Note: Export market share is calculated as an index of export volumes divided by an index 
of foreign demand (where foreign demand is defined as a country-specific export-weighted 
sum of foreign import volumes of goods and services). 
As the rise in China’s export market share seems to be the main counterpart to the loss in the 
euro area’s export market share, we can provide further insights into the mechanisms behind 
                                                 
5   For further details, see ESCB (2005) and ECB Monthly Bulletin (2006).     9
this loss by examining Chinese exports in terms of their sectoral composition and how they 
compare with the export specialisation of the euro area, and how euro area exporters are 
adjusting their export structure over time in order to respond to this competitive challenge. 
However, as discussed in more detail below, these measures of trade specialisation are subject 
to various caveats and should be interpreted with caution. 
Over the period 1993-2006, euro area exporters have been largely specialising in capital- and 
research-intensive products as well as labour-intensive goods (Table 1). By contrast, the other 
advanced competitor countries – i.e., US and Japan – do not have a revealed comparative 
advantage in labour-intensive products but are relatively more specialised in exports of 
research-intensive goods (with Japan also specialising in capital goods exports). Meanwhile, 
China is specialised in exporting labour-intensive goods. Although the euro area seems 
somewhat overweight in labour-intensive sectors, the sectoral export specialisation by factor 
intensity generally seems to broadly reflect the countries’ relative factor endowments with 
higher-skilled workers being relatively abundant in the euro area and Japan and the USA, 
while lower-skilled workers being prevalent in China.  
Table 1 Revealed comparative advantage by factor intensity* 
                       
     





area  USA Japan  China  CEECs 
  
   Raw materials                   
    intensive  0.5 0.7 0.1 0.5 1.7     
                       
   Labour                   
    intensive  1.1 0.8 0.5 2.3 1.1     
                       
   Capital                   
    intensive  1.2 0.9 1.6 0.3 1.2     
                       
   Research                   
    intensive  1.1 1.4 1.5 1.0 0.5     
                       
* Balassa index of revealed comparative advantage; Average for the period 1993-2006. An index greater than one indicates that a 
country specializes in that product. CEECs are the Commonwealth of Independent States. 
Source: Chelem, ECB calculations; di Mauro and Forster (2007).             
 
Figure 9 shows that the euro area’s export specialisation is not changing much over time in 
research- and labour-intensive products, which seems surprising given that one might expect   10
the euro area to show signs of moving away from labour-intensive products following the 
large increase in the effective global labour supply available at cheap wage rates. On the one 
hand, this lack of movement in specialization might reflect structural rigidities in the euro area 
countries, where product and labour market regulations may constrain the ability of firms to 
adjust in a rapid and optimal fashion to the forces of globalisation. On the other hand, it might 
also be the case that the euro area is not under significant competitive pressures to move away 
from some labour-intensive products where they may not be in direct price competition with 
emerging countries as the euro area exports may be superior in terms of quality.
6 








1993 1995 1997 1999 2001 2003 2005
China labour intensive goods Euro area labour intensive goods
China research intensive goods Euro area research intensive goods
 
Source: Chelem and ECB calculations. 
Note:    Balassa index of revealed comparative advantage 
 
However, Figure 9 also clearly shows that China is rapidly moving away from labour-
intensive products and increasing it’s specialisation in research-intensive products, and 
eventually becoming similar to the euro area at the end of the sample period in terms of its 
degree of specialisation in research-intensive products. Overall, these results should be viewed 
                                                 
6   A major question concerning the competitiveness of Chinese exports is whether the lower price of Chinese exports 
indicates a lower quality of Chinese exports in comparison to major advanced country exporters such as the USA or 
UK.  On the one hand, Fontagne, Gaulier and Zignago (2007) look at the export specialisation of North-South  
countries and claim that although the export specialisation of the two sets of countries is quite similar when 
considered across broadly defined sectors, they are quite different when the differentiation of products – reflected in 
unit value indices - is taken into account. Overall, their analysis shows that advanced economies are maintaining their 
advantage in the upper segment of product markets and that North-South countries are not competing directly with 
each other.  By contrast, Jarvis (2006) matches products according to quality criteria and shows that China and other 
low-cost countries can export products of the same quality - but at significantly lower prices – as high-cost countries.      11
with some caution as there are several caveats regarding these measures of revealed 
comparative advantage. First, the measures can be somewhat subjective as some products are 
difficult to classify by factor-intensity as they use several factors of production to a similar 
extent. Second, the classification by factor-intensity may be misleading if a country focuses 
primarily on the labour-intensive production stages of a predominantly research-intensive 
good (this may particularly apply to China where foreign firms may be outsourcing the 
labour-intensive parts of production for a variety of research or capital-intensive products and 
then using China as an export base).  
Turning to Balassa indices of export specialisation by technological content, we distinguish 
between high-, medium-, and low-tech sectors (Table 2). The euro area as a whole is 
relatively specialised in medium-high tech exports and appears to be less open to direct 
competition in these sectors from China which is specialising primarily in low-tech sectors, 
particularly textiles, clothing and footwear.
7 This is not true, however, for all euro area 
countries. In particular, Greece, Portugal, and to a lesser extent Italy, appear to be rather 
strongly specialised in low and medium-low technology sectors (particularly textiles, etc),
8 
where China is gaining predominance largely due to its substantially lower labour costs.  
 
                                                 
7   One further criticism of measures of revealed comparative advantage is that the internationalisation of production 
may render measures of export specialisation less meaningful nowadays as exported goods now embody substantial 
international outsourcing of production inputs. This issue is addressed in detail in Baumann and di Mauro (2007) who 
compute an index of trade specialisation which nets out intermediate imports of exports and compares it with the 
export specialisation results reported above. This modified version of the Lafay index of revealed comparative 
advantage by industry generally gives similar results to the traditional Balassa indices of export specialisation 
reported in this paper, confirming that the euro area is highly specialised in medium-high tech sectors and has not 
changed its specialisation much over time. 
8   See Box 3 in Baumann and di Mauro (2006) and ECB 2006.   12
Table 2 Revealed comparative advantage by sector*          
        EA USA  China    
                     
High Technology (HT)     0.8  1.4  1.0    
   Aircraft and spacecraft   0.8  3.5  0.1    
   Pharmaceuticals      1.5  0.9  0.3    
   Office, accounting and computing machinery   0.7  1.0  1.6    
   Medical, precision and optical instruments   0.9  1.7  0.9    
Medium-high-technology industries (MHT)  1.2  1.1  0.6    
   Electrical machinery and apparatus, n.e.s.   0.9  1.0  1.5    
   Motor vehicles, transport equipment, n.e.s.   1.3  0.9  0.1    
   Chemicals excluding pharmaceuticals   1.2  1.2  0.5    
   Machinery and equipment, n.e.s.   1.2  1.2  0.7    
Low-technology industries (LT)     1.0  0.8  1.6    
   Wood     1.2  1.0  0.4    
   Textiles, clothing, footwear   0.9  0.4  3.5    
                   
Source: Chelem and ECB calculations. 
* Balassa index of comparative advantage (average 1993-2006)             
 
This seems to be consistent with the fact that the loss in export market share of the euro area 
is the result of a relatively diverse performance across euro area countries, with the export 
share losses of some euro area countries weighing rather heavily on the euro area aggregate. 
This suggests that some individual euro area countries who have lost export market share over 
the past decade or so – such as Italy, Spain and Portugal - may have been more strongly 
affected than others by globalisation possibly due to their lower-tech export specialisation 
which may expose them more directly to competition from China. The analysis by Esteves 
and Reis (2006) - who extend traditional weights used in effective exchange rates to cover not 
only competition in third markets but also product specialisation – come to similar 
conclusions. Their approach significantly increases the weight of competition with non-Japan 
Asia for Italy, Spain and especially Portugal, reflecting the fact that these countries have a 
product specialisation more concentrated in sectors such as textiles, clothing and footwear 
which are particularly vulnerable to competition from Asian economies, particularly China.  
3.2   Imports and the rising share of low-cost countries 
Intra-euro area imports have been growing strongly, but euro area imports from low-cost 
countries such as China and the EU New Member States (NMS) have been growing even 
more rapidly. Over the last decade, both intra- and extra-euro area imports of manufactured   13
goods showed robust growth, but the ratio of intra to extra-euro area trade volumes has 
steadily declined which – again - may not be fully explained by movements in relative prices 
(Figure 10).
 9 Globalisation forces have been driving the relatively stronger growth of extra-
euro area imports – which has displaced some intra-euro area trade - with outsourcing to low-
cost countries and the internationalisation of production playing an important role. During the 
past ten years, the shares of low-cost countries in extra euro area imports of manufactures – 
particularly those from China and the new EU Member States – have increased considerably, 
accompanied by a loss in the import shares of higher-cost extra-euro area import suppliers  
such as the United States, Japan and the United Kingdom (Figure 11).
10 These developments 
while admittedly boosting the welfare of euro area consumers have on the other hand 
probably affected the transmission of foreign demand shocks to euro area domestic demand 
by weakening some of the potential positive intra-trade spillovers on domestic demand.
11 
Figure 10.  Intra- and extra-euro area imports of 
manufactured goods  
(Index: 2002Q1=100;  monthly data) 
Figure 11. Share of extra-euro area manufacturing 
imports from low cost countries 





































YoY change in percentage points (lhs)
Share of low-cost countries (rhs)
Source: Eurostat. 
Note: Last observation refers to December 2008. 
Source: Eurostat and ECB calculations 
Note: Last observation August 2008 
 
                                                 
9   The relative price of the two sources of imports in 2008 is very similar to what it was in 1995, perhaps implying that a 
structural trend decline is taking place in the ratio of intra- to extra-import volumes that is not explained by relative 
prices. 
10   Of course, this is also simply reflecting the flip side of the loss in export market share of the major advanced 
industrialised countries associated with the rapidly rising export share of China described earlier. 
11   See Anderton and di Mauro (2008) for a comprehensive description of these linkages.    14
One possible implication of the internationalization of production is that the increasing trend 
in outsourcing may have had a negative spillover on economic activity as it could have 
reduced the value added of export activities by increasing the reliance of euro area exporters 
on imported intermediate inputs. ESCB (2005) shows that the import content of exports 
(which is the inverse of the value added per unit of export) - measured as the long-run 
elasticity of imports with respect to a one unit increase in exports - has risen for the euro area 
from 38% in 1995 to around 44% in 2000. Furthermore, this rise in the import-intensity of 
exports is almost entirely due to trade external to the EU, as the import-intensity of internal 
EU trade did not change much over this period.
12 However, globalisation and the 
internationalisation of production has also boosted exports as well. As a result, given that the 
share of exports in GDP is now much larger (Figure 5), the net impact of a 1% increase in 
exports on GDP growth may have remained roughly constant for the euro area.
13  
Rising imports from low-cost countries are also putting downward pressure on extra-euro area 
manufacturing import prices. This is mostly due to the increasing share of low-cost countries 
in euro area imports combined with the relatively cheaper prices of imports from low-cost 
countries. Since the start of the 2000s, the share of low-cost countries in extra-euro area 
manufacturing imports has increased from just over one-third to almost a half (Figure 11). 
Among the low-cost countries, China and the New EU Member States (NMS) were the main 
contributors to this increase with both of their shares roughly doubling since the mid-1990s to 
stand at around 12% each in 2008. Based on highly detailed data disaggregated both by 
sectors and countries over the period 1995-2004, Figure 12 shows that the level of import 
prices (proxied by absolute unit value indices) from China and the NMS are estimated to be 
approximately one-quarter the import price of total euro area import prices, and about one-
fifth the price of imports from high-cost countries.   
 
 
                                                 
12   As the data relate 1995-2000, the EU excludes the new EU Member States who joined the European Union in 2004.  
13  Another aspect of this globalisation-related phenomena is its possible effects on the trade impacts of exchange rate 
movements. Given that the import content of exports is rising over time, one would expect that import prices are 
becomingly an increasingly important component of exporters’ costs, which may lead to smaller losses in export price 
competitiveness in response to an appreciation of the exchange rate compared to the past which, in turn, may mitigate 
the negative impact of a euro appreciation on export volumes (as an appreciation will reduce the cost of imported 
inputs and exporters can reduce their prices to partly offset the loss in competitiveness from the appreciation). See 
Anderton (2007) as well as later section on the terms of trade.   15
Figure 12.  Euro area manufacturing import price levels by import  
supplier 














Sources: Eurostat Comext data and ECB staff calculations. 
 
Overall, it is estimated that the increase in import penetration from low-cost countries over 
this period may have dampened euro area import price inflation by an average of around 2 
percentage points (pp) each year, mostly accounted for by China and the NMS. The impact is 
decomposed into two components: the first is the “share effect”, which captures the 
downward impact on import prices of the rising import share of low-cost countries combined 
with the relatively lower price level of low-cost import suppliers; and the second due to 
differentials in the growth of import prices (the “price effect”), which captures the impact of 
lower import price inflation from the low-cost countries relative to the high-cost ones over the 
sample period.  
During the course of 2007-2008, there was speculation that this disinflationary impact of low-
cost countries on euro area import prices might be coming to an end due to increasing 
inflationary pressures in those countries. At face value, the robust increases during 2008 in 
import prices by low-cost country import suppliers might be interpreted as a sign that the 
downward impact from low-cost countries was waning (Figure 13). However, these import 
price increases primarily reflected the lagged impact of higher energy and raw materials prices 
up to the first half of 2008 which have pushed up the prices of virtually all euro area import   16
suppliers (Figure 14).
14 Nevertheless, economic development, robust wage increases and 
terms of trade deterioration in low-cost countries, as well as increasing sophistication, variety 
and technological content of exports would suggest that low-cost countries are making a leap-
up in the value chain and that their export bundles are becoming increasingly similar to the 
more advanced western economies, which will ultimately lead in the long-run to a 
convergence of their export prices to higher international levels.  
Figure 13.  Prices of euro area manufacturing imports 
from selected countries and regions 
(Unit value indices in euro; 2001Q1=100) 
Figure 14. Extra-euro area import prices by commodity 




















non-energy commodities 3-month moving average
manufacturing 3-month moving average
total import price of goods 3-month moving average
oil-brent (rhs) 3-month moving average
 
Source: Eurostat and ECB calculations.  Source: ECB 
Note: Last observation refers to January 2009 
 
So far, we have only referred to the downward impact of low-cost countries on manufacturing 
import prices. However, there have also been globalisation-related effects on euro area import 
prices working in the opposite direction as the strong growth in the non-OECD economies in 
recent years seems to partly explain the significant rise in the prices of oil and non-energy 
commodities since 1999 up to the first half of 2008 (Figure 14). For example, Pain et al 
(2006) calculate that if the GDP of the non-OECD countries during the period 2000-2005 had 
grown at the slower pace of the OECD countries then the world real oil price would have been 
up to 40% lower by the end of 2005. Overall, Figure 14 shows how globalisation has helped 
to keep extra-euro area manufacturing import prices fairly flat since the start of the 2000s, 
while the rising price of oil and other commodities (particularly metals and foods) are 
                                                 
14 Amiti and Davis (2009) show that the significant rise in prices of  US imports from China between 2006-2008 
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reflected in the stronger growth of total extra-euro area import prices over the same period. 
Meanwhile, from the second half of 2008 onwards the downward pressure on euro area import 
prices from the large fall in oil prices is reinforced by the continuing downward pressure on 
manufacturing import prices due to the continually rising import shares from low-cost 
countries.  
 
3.3   Exchange rate pass-through to euro area import prices and domestic 
prices 
Exchange rate pass-through (ERPT) is another factor which may have been affected by 
globalisation. For example, there may have been a decline in ERPT for import and consumer 
prices due to stronger competitive pressures or the shift to a lower inflation regime (Taylor, 
2000). At the same time there may also be reasons why estimates of ERPT might increase 
over time, such as the aforementioned increase in import penetration (Figures 1 and 5) which 
leads to a higher share of imports in the HICP implying a larger impact on the HICP of a 
change in the exchange rate. The main conclusion of the empirical literature is that during the 
past two decades ERPT has declined for a number of countries, particularly for the United 
States (see Marazzi et al 2005; Ihrig, Marazzi and Rothenberg, 2006, etc). Although the 
empirical evidence for the euro area is somewhat mixed, some results suggest that the ERPT 
has declined. For example, although estimates of the pass-through for extra-euro area import 
prices at the sectoral level seem stable, compositional effects may have reduced ERPT to the 
aggregate import price because the sectoral composition of imports in recent years has moved 
towards lower ERPT products (such as chemicals and motor vehicles) and the share of 
imports accounted for by high ERPT products has fallen.
15  In addition, Anderton (2007) 
argues that the changing country composition of import suppliers may have reduced ERPT for 
euro area manufacturing import prices. For example, the ERPT of euro area manufacturing 
imports from the United States is around 90% compared to an average ERPT of around 50-
70%, hence this higher ERPT combined with the significant fall in the share of the United 
States in euro area imports over the past ten years will result in a lower ERPT.  Meanwhile, di 
Mauro, Rueffer and Binda (2008) show that evidence for a decline in the ERPT to domestic 
prices is far less conclusive for the euro area in comparison to the United States. However, 
they do find some evidence of a decline in ERPT to consumer prices for some euro area 
                                                 
15   See Osbat and Wagner (2008); and Campa, Goldberg and Gonzalez-Minguez (2007).     18
countries such as Germany and, to a lesser extent, France and Italy. Meanwhile, Hahn (2007) 
finds some small decline in the ERPT to euro area producer prices in industry, as the weight 
in electricity, gas and water supply, which has a high ERPT, decreased.                
 
3.4   Globalisation and the terms of trade 
 
One of the mechanisms by which globalisation may benefit advanced industrialized countries 
is via improvements in the terms of trade. Globalisation seems to be leading to downward 
pressure on manufacturing import prices from increased imports from low-cost countries and 
should, ceteris paribus, lead to improvements in the terms of trade.  Although there is 
considerable volatility over time mostly due to movements in the exchange rate, Figures 15 
and 16 suggest that there is no strong evidence of a long-run trend improvement in the terms 
of trade for the euro area. 
16 
 
Figure 15 shows trade prices in total goods and services and depicts a worsening of the terms 
of trade in recent years which is probably driven by the rise in oil prices from 1999 onwards. 
Nevertheless, if we exclude the direct impacts of oil prices by looking at import and export 
prices for manufactured goods (Figure 16), there are still no signs of a trend improvement in 
the terms of trade for the euro area. Although this is a very preliminary and rough analysis and 
should be viewed with caution,
17 there may be several reasons why the terms of trade have not 
improved for euro area trade in manufactures. First, although low-cost countries are putting 
downward pressure on euro area import prices, high-cost countries might be upgrading the 
quality of their products due to this increased competition and thereby increasing their export 
prices to the euro area. Second, as mentioned earlier, the rising import content of exports 
implies that imports are becoming an increasingly important cost component of exports 
which, in turn, means that export and import prices may move more closely together than in 
the past (thereby dampening the expected improvements in the terms of trade resulting from 
globalisation). Third, increased competition from China in world markets may have put 
downward pressure on euro area export prices of manufactures. 
                                                 
16   Although movements in the exchange rate affect the terms of trade, the long-run trends in the charts should still be 
informative as the depreciation of the effective exchange rate of the euro during 1999-2000 has been roughly offset 
by the appreciation from 2002 onwards.     
17    ESCB (2005) Box 2 investigates developments in the terms of trade in more detail at the sectoral level but also finds 
little evidence of an improvement in the terms of trade.     19
Figure 15.  Euro area terms of trade for goods and 
services 
(Index: 2000=100) 
Figure 16. Euro area terms of trade for manufactured 
goods 


















Exports Imports Terms of trade (rhs)
 
Source: National accounts data (AWM database) and ECB calculations. 
Note: The terms of trade are calculated by dividing the euro area export 
price deflator of goods and services by the import deflator. 
National accounts data are total trade (ie intra+extra). 
Source: Eurostat and ECB calculations. 
Note: The terms of trade are calculated by dividing extra-euro area 
export price of manufactured goods by the import price of manufactured 
goods. 
 
4  Globalisation and euro area productivity 
 
Globalisation is closely linked to the process of technological advancement, and accordingly 
would be expected to boost productivity as trade and capital flows lead to increased technical 
efficiency across economic areas over time in the absence of frictions. Three channels may be 
of particular importance in this process. First, globalisation may constitute a form of 
technology transfer both through input flows (i.e. imports of capital goods and labour 
mobility) and the transfer of multifactor productivity (including, notably, the enhancement of 
management techniques to best practice standards). Though often associated with trade 
between developing and developed economies, technological convergence nonetheless can 
occur (particularly in terms of multifactor productivity) for trade between developed 
economies. Moreover, the growth of offshoring may indicate that changing production 
paradigms could also be considered in the context of technology transfer. Second, 
globalisation may result in composition and scale effects, whereby higher average 
productivity may result from both the composition of firms (given both increased 
specialisation according to comparative advantage and competitive forces) and the possibility 
for firms to increase the scale of their operations (consistent with the notion of economies of 
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defensive innovation, whereby firms are more innovative in response to stronger global 
competitive pressures (corroborated by the general finding that exporters tend to have higher 
productivity than firms producing solely for the domestic market). The second and third 
channels can be characterised as distributional channels to the extent that they imply gains for 
competitive firms as well as the potential demise of uncompetitive firms. To this end, 
maximum net benefits from globalisation would be expected where domestic labour and 
product markets are as competitive as those of key trading partners.  
A review of the recent euro area experience would suggest that aggregate euro area 
productivity gains owing to globalisation were generally absent despite steadily increasing 
international openness in the period leading up to 2007, in apparent contrast to the above 
arguments (Figure 17). A closer look at the sectoral dimension underlying these aggregate 
productivity developments, however, yields a more nuanced picture, whereby the productivity 
shortfall can be to a large extent explained by developments in sectors with limited exposure 
to international competitive pressures or frictions which limit productivity gains. In particular, 
as shown in Table 3, the relative weakness in euro area hourly labour productivity relative to 
the US has derived from weakness in sectors which can be thought of as more insulated from 
international competition. In particular, two salient features emerge from a sectoral analysis of 
productivity in the euro area and its relation to that of the US. First, productivity growth 
remains considerably higher in manufacturing than services, with a particularly low outturn in 
the latter. Second, the main contributors to the productivity gap in the service sector with the 
US remains concentrated in two areas: “finance and business services”, and “distribution 
services” (including, notably, wholesale and retail trade), which can be thought of as 
Information & Communications Technology (ICT) using services.
18 This could suggest a role 
for competitive pressures – both domestic and international – though of course it cannot be 
excluded that other factors such as capital intensity, technology, skill content, or the influence 
of terms of trade developments (for example, given their influence on international 
competitiveness) may also have contributed to this development.  
                                                 
18   See Gomez-Salvador et al. (2006) for a more detailed exposition on this taxonomy. While there is also a significant gap in 
the “electrical machinery” sector (containing such subsectors as office machinery and electronics), which can be thought of 
as “ICT producing”, a small weight of this sector in the economy implies a relatively minor contribution to the productivity 
shortfall.    21
Figure 17.  Output per hour growth and trade openness in the Euro Area 

















sum of exports and imports of goods as a
percentage of GDP (right-hand scale)
real GDP per hour worked (left-hand scale)
 
Sources: ECB calculations based on Eurostat and AMECO data. 
Note: Trade openness is defined here as the sum of extra-euro area export values and import 
values expressed as a percentage of GDP. 
 
Table 3 Sectoral value added per hour, euro area versus the US 
  
(annual average growth rate over 1995-2004, %)          
           
  
euro 
area US  difference 
           
Manufacturing 2.3  5.3  -3.0 
           
Electrical and optical equipment  4.9  14.5  -9.6 
           
Manufacturing excluding electrical  1.8  3.1  -1.3 
           
Market services  0.4  2.8  -2.4 
           
Distribution services  1.3  4.4  -3.1 
of which: Wholesale trade*  2.1 4.7  -2.6 
of which: Retail trade,* repair of household 
goods  0.7 5.1  -4.4 
           
Finance and business services**  -0.6  2.6  -3.2 
of which: Financial intermediation  1.7 4.9  -3.2 
           
Personal services†  -0.4 1.0  -1.4 
           
Source: EU KLEMS database.          
Note: Euro area excluding Greece, Ireland, Luxembourg, Portugal and 
Slovenia.       
*   excludes motor vehicles and motorcycles          
** excludes real estate 
† Personal services includes: Hotels and restaurants; Other community, social and personal services; 
and Private households with employed persons  
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Examining the traded goods sector in more detail, increasing productivity in relation to higher 
import openness is present within the manufacturing sector at a sectoral level. Indeed, trade 
openness appears to have a positive relationship with productivity within the manufacturing 
sector, though this derives to a large extent from impressive productivity gains in sectors 
generally characterised as having a high technology content, such as the electrical sector (see 
Figure 18). Moreover, the relationship of product market regulation with productivity has also 
been negative on average across euro area countries over the decade leading up to 2005, with 
a strong contribution from some more pronounced cases such as Ireland (see Figure 19). Such 
a negative relationship could result from rigidities inhibiting the positive reallocative and 
other benefits of structural changes to the economy such as globalisation and technological 
change.  
Figure 18. Changes in manufacturing openness and 
productivity in euro area sectors 
(Average annual change between 1995 and 2004, %) 
Figure 19. Product market regulation and labour 
productivity growth across euro area countries 
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Source: COMEXT (trade data) and EU KLEMS (domestic), ECB 
calculations. 
Note: Import share defined as imports divided by output by sector.  
Source: OECD. 
Note: The OECD index of product market regulation covers formal 
regulations in the following areas of state control of business enterprises, 
legal and administrative barriers to entrepreneurship and barriers to 
international trade and investment For more details, see Conway et al. 
(2005). 
Available empirical evidence suggests a significant link between openness and productivity 
through multiple channels, with stronger positive impacts in more competitive markets. More 
specifically, it would appear that, while globalisation has a strong role to play in boosting 
productivity, euro area productivity has been weak at the aggregate level over the last decade 
despite growing international openness. More detailed sectoral analyses, based both on macro   23
and firm-level micro data, indicate that this weakness has derived to a large extent from areas 
of the economy which are more sheltered from international competition, thereby hinting at a 
role for policies aiming at enhancing openness to such forces.  
Empirical studies examining productivity developments across a wide range of developed 
economies at a more aggregated level (generally on the basis of cross-country & sectoral 
panels) suggest trade liberalisation contributes positively to economic performance. As 
reported in Price and Cournède (2007), a one percentage point rise in trade exposure is found 
to be associated with a rise in per capita income of 0.4%. Helbling et al. (2006) find that a 1% 
increase in relative trade openness leads to a 0.12% increase in relative productivity. Chen et 
al. (2007) find evidence of a productivity acceleration of EU manufacturing over last years 
through competitive effects induced by increased trade openness.  
Empirical studies using firm-level data allow for a more detailed examination of the important 
channels through which globalisation enhances productivity – indicating that trade openness 
and capital flows foster technological spillovers and increased competition – leading to a 
higher scale of firm operations and more productive firm composition. On spillovers, Eaton 
and Kortum (2002) find that domestic productivity growth is mainly related to foreign rather 
than domestic innovation, while Baldwin et al. (2005) find bilateral spillovers are boosted by 
bilateral FDI. On scale effects, Geishecker et al. (2007) argue that multinational firms 
contribute more than domestic firms to enhance productivity growth, with the finding that the 
small share of euro area firms which locate affiliates abroad have higher survival rates and 
productivity growth. Ottaviano et al. (2007) and Melitz (2003) find that countries exhibiting 
technological advantage, freer entry and better accessibility to foreign firms develop a tougher 
competitive environment in which firms are more productive and operate at a larger scale. 
Concerning industry composition, Bernard et al. (2007) using plant-level data for the US 
manufacturing sector find evidence of exit, growth and industry switching as a means of 
migrating from comparative-disadvantage to comparative advantage activities, as well as 
changes in product portfolio.  
In conjunction with the notion that globalisation boosts international competitive pressures, 
the general absence of aggregate euro area productivity gains over the last decade appear to 
derive from areas under-exposed to international competition. In particular, relatively weak 
euro area productivity at an aggregate level can be linked to barriers to competition (both 
domestic and international), implying limited productivity-enhancing use of new   24
technologies, multifactor productivity and regulatory impediments to adjustment. According 
to Gomez-Salvador et al. (2006), the euro area economy seems to have benefited much less 
from production and use of ICT, reflecting both lower investment in ICT compared with the 
US and barriers to the diffusion or appropriate use of new technologies, in particular in the 
services sector (consistent with Table 3). Inklaar et al (2008) find that for European Union 
countries, entry liberalisation has been beneficial for productivity growth in 
telecommunications, but not in other service industries. Van Ark (2007) argues that an 
institutional environment that slows down change may hold up the structural adjustment 
process in Europe and impede the reallocation of resources to their most productive uses. 
Kroszner (2006) argues that cross-country productivity differentials derive importantly from 
flexibility at the firm level and in labour markets, and competitive pressure throughout the 
economy.  
 
5  Globalisation and the euro area labour market 
 
Globalisation would be expected to influence euro area labour market conditions through two 
main channels. First, a redistributive channel would be expected as globalisation contributes 
to changes in the distribution of sectoral, occupational and skill composition in advanced 
economies.  According to traditional paradigms, such a development in advanced economies 
would be expected to be biased predominantly against low-skilled workers in advanced 
economies (as increased offshoring possibilities lead to an increasing wage elasticity of labour 
demand with implications for worker bargaining power in this skill cohort) and in favour of 
high-skilled workers (given expanding export markets). This can be related to the notion of 
job losses with import competition and job gains from export demand, as posited in trade 
theories such as Heckscher-Ohlin, though the latter theory along with other prominent 
theories would have mixed predictions regarding net changes in employment across and 
within industries, along with consequences for relative factor rewards (see Bernard et al, 
2007). Second, an aggregate scale channel would be expected in the long run, whereby labour 
demand is boosted by productivity gains accruing from international openness. Following 
from the analysis in the preceding section of this paper, the scale effect is likely to have 
remained limited thus far in the euro area on aggregate given a weak overall productivity 
performance to date (though in the long run the balance could shift). In the long run, while the   25
consequences for the labour market depend on the interplay of the scale effects with an 
aggregation of the redistributive aspects, in the short run, structural features of the labour 
market have a crucial role in adjustment mechanisms. As noted in Hoekman and Winters 
(2005), the effects of trade on wages and employment will depend on labour market 
institutions, the efficiency of capital markets and the mobility of factors across sectors (and 
borders).  
As already alluded to in Section 2 of this paper, one of the main features of the current wave 
of globalisation which distinguishes it from previous episodes is the possibility of production 
fragmentation and related offshoring as described in studies such as Feenstra (2007) and 
Baldwin (2006). While difficult to accurately gauge its exact intensity given a lack of direct 
information on which parts of production stages are contracted out, several methods may be 
applied to obtain information on international outsourcing, such as individual firm 
management information, anecdotal evidence and statistical evidence from various 
macroeconomic proxies (such as data on trade).
19 Using the latter methodology, the macro 
proxy of trade content designed to capture a narrow measure of offshoring, it would appear 
that offshoring was growing in both manufacturing and services over the period 1995-2000, 
but nonetheless remained much higher in the former sector though growing less in recent 
years since that period (see Figure 20). That said, anecdotal evidence, such as management 
studies, suggest that services outsourcing has been growing since 2000 in the euro area (see 
ECB, 2006a) – particularly in “arm’s length” service provision.
20 In analysing how offshoring 
relates to employment outcomes at the industry level (within manufacturing, where data is 
available), it appears that the relation to outsourcing across manufacturing industries is weak 
for employment in the manufacturing sector as a whole, though there are significant impacts 
in some industries, such as textiles (Figure 21). 
                                                 
19   This measure is a proxy with several caveats, most notably that the import share which could reflect domestic demand as 
well as domestic supply channels, plays a very important role in its dynamics. Computations made to obtain post-2000 
outsourcing estimates using interpolated input-output table coefficients (unavailable for services).  
20   Bhagwati (2004) notes four ways in which services can be traded: (1) “arm’s length” service provision, whereby the supplier 
and buyer remaining in their respective locations (e.g. call centres, back offices and software programmers.), (2) services are 
provided by moving the service recipient to the location of the service provider. (e.g. tourism and education), (3) the service 
provider establishes a commercial presence in another country (requiring an element of direct foreign investment), and (4) 
the service seller moves to the location of the service buyer (e.g. construction and consulting services, requiring temporary 
migration).   26
Figure 20. Trade-based narrow offshoring measure by 
sector for the euro area  
(Share of industry’s imported inputs in the industry’s output, %) 
Figure 21. Employment and offshoring within euro area 
manufacturing 






































































Source: ECB calculations based on COMEXT data and OECD input-output 
tables. 
Note: Offshoring defined “narrowly”, i.e. sectoral share of imported inputs 
of the given sector in its output; includes both intra and extra euro area 
trade; extrapolation for 2004 based on interpolated input-output table 
coefficients 
Source: COMEXT (trade data) and EU KLEMS (domestic). 
Note: Narrow offshoring refers to ratio of own imported inputs to production 
 
Broadening the focus to also incorporate the service sector, survey data also indicate a limited 
offshoring contribution to job losses. As shown in Figure 22, survey data based on media 
reports indicates that “direct” job losses from offshoring are generally limited as a proportion 
of overall jobs lost – with an economy-wide average of 8% of total jobs lost.
21 The sectoral 
composition of such reported job losses is predominantly in manufacturing and generally low 
numbers in services, and to some extent can be seen as correlated with domestic productivity 
developments within the affected sectors.   
Changing specialisation brought about by globalisation may, of course, imply gross job losses 
are offset by gross gains on the aggregate. Indeed, there have been significant euro area 
employment gains since mid-1990s almost entirely in services while manufacturing appears to 
have been in continued secular decline (see Table  4). In particular, business services 
                                                 
21  These findings are drawn from a the “European Restructuring Monitor”, which records all industrial restructuring cases 
reported through a press review of daily newspapers and business press that (1) affect at least one EU country; (2) entail an 
announced or actual reduction of at least 100 jobs; or (3) involve sites employing more than 250 people and affecting at least 
10% of workforce; or (4) create at least 100 jobs. For more, see http://www.eurofound.europa.eu/emcc/erm/info.htm.    27
employment has grown very strongly in the last decade, despite likely growing tradability of 
this component (see, for instance, Markusen, 2007 and Mann, 2003). Amiti and Wei (2005) 
argue that although service outsourcing has been steadily increasing it is still very low, and 
that in the United States and many other industrial countries insourcing of services (i.e. from 
foreign-located firms to domestic firms) is greater than outsourcing. Of course, factors other 
than (though not necessarily totally independent of) globalisation may explain a significant 
amount of labour market adjustment over the last decade, such as technological change and 
structural changes and their effects on permanent shifts in the distribution of workers 
throughout the economy in the labour market (for more on the latter argument, see Groshen 
and Potter, 2003).  
Figure 22.  Survey data on euro area jobs directly lost due to offshoring 
(offshoring job losses as a % of total job losses over the period 2002-2006) 
















Mining Economy wide 
average = 8%
 
Source: European Restructuring Monitor. 
Note: Euro area excludes Greece, Luxembourg and Slovenia. Based on media survey on 
reported mass layoffs. Includes offshoring within the euro area as well as outside. 
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Table 4 Euro area employment, 1996 versus 2006    
(millions)          
  
1996 2006  change, 1996-
2006 
Total domestic  122.71  139.68  16.97 
           
Total industry  34.53  35.02  0.48 
Industry excluding construction  25.42  24.48  -0.94 
Construction 9.11  10.54  1.42 
           
Total services  81.49  98.87  17.38 
Trade and transport  30.34  35.11  4.77 
Finance and business  14.99  21.65  6.66 
Other services  36.17  42.11  5.95 
           
Agriculture 6.69  5.80  -0.89 
           
Source: Eurostat data and ECB calculations.       
           
These survey findings appear prima facie consistent with available empirical evidence on the 
aggregate employment effects of globalisation, which suggest a small negative estimated 
impact of import penetration and offshoring on euro area employment within the 
manufacturing sector. That said, little evidence is available on globalisation’s impacts for 
employment in the economy as a whole. The analysis of Pula and Skudelny (2009) suggests 
that a one percentage point increase in openness reduces manufacturing employment growth 
by 0-0.2 percentage point (depending on the industry composition). Mankiw and Swagel 
(2006) argue that trade-related losses are a small portion of overall job flows, a fact that is 
also empirically borne out by the analysis of Hiebert and Vansteenkiste (2008a) for the US 
manufacturing sector. At the same time, Hiebert and Vansteenkiste (2008b) find evidence for 
the US manufacturing that other factors such as technological change tend to engender greater 
labour market impacts than changes in openness.   
In examining factors governing offshoring decisions, survey data for the services sector 
suggests both a distance and cost component to such offshoring, with offshoring relatively 
higher to geographically close neighbours, and concentrated in industries characterised by a 
higher degree tradability (see Figures 23 and 24). The geographic destination of service sector 
offshoring for euro area firms shows that the majority remains with geographically close firms 
such as non-euro area EU countries. On average 20% of the firms claimed to outsource to 
foreign developed countries (EU + US) and only 10% to emerging economies (Asia + 
Others). As for factors cited in electing to outsource (i.e. domestically and internationally),   29
reduction of staff costs is claimed to be a major factor in at least three of the services sectors, 
i.e. transportation and storage, business services and financial intermediation. These sectors, 
which are not normally broadly classified as lower-skilled areas, raise the issue that so-called 
“white-collar” offshoring may have been on the increase, in contrast from the predictions of 
traditional trade theory that low-skilled jobs are primarily affected by trade competition. 
Unfortunately, little data exists to statistically validate this notion. Ultimately, though, the 
above survey data appears broadly consistent with Markusen (2007), where it is argued that 
characteristics such as codifiability, routinisation, and the lack of need for face-to-face 
interaction are of great importance in the outsourcing decision for service industries, while 
costs and market penetration determine the geographical decision on where to outsource. 
Indeed, while ICT accelerates the codification of knowledge and modifies the balance 
between codified and tacit knowledge, there may still be continued benefits from human 
interaction based on the latter (see Morgan, 2004). An alternative perspective comes from a 
European Sourcing survey by Eurostat (see Alajääskö, 2009), where it is found that 
manufacturing enterprises source far more than enterprises active in other sectors, while 
among the support business functions, the international sourcing of ‘distribution and logistics’ 
as well as ‘marketing and (after-) sales’ is most widespread. 
Figure 23. Survey data on current locations of 
outsourcing in euro area service sector (% of respondents) 
Figure 24. Survey data on current factors underlying 
outsourcing in euro area service sector (% of respondents) 















































Source: NTC Economics (2007).  Source: NTC Economics (2007).   30
Part of the growth in euro area employment over the last years, despite growing outsourcing, 
may relate to immigration developments. Migration flows may be related to outsourcing 
trends, insofar as they obviate a need for firms to go outside borders to have access to 
inexpensive low-skilled labour as part of cost cutting through production fragmentation – 
though the extent to which migration inflows limit cost-saving offshoring depends, of course, 
on the extent to which labour regulations oblige employers to pay immigrants at prevailing 
host country rates (given, for instance, minimum wage legislation). There has been a steadily 
increasing inflows of migrants to the euro area, with a heterogeneous skill mix depending on 
geographic origin. Eurostat data indicate a steady growth in net inward migration in the euro 
area over the last decade, bringing such flows recently to a level above the US (Figure 25). In 
examining the skill distribution of migrant versus native populations within the EU15 (where 
data is available), it would appear that migrant flows have involved both a relatively large 
proportion of unskilled labour (from outside the EU) as well as a relatively higher medium- to 
high-skill content from migration within the EU (Figure 26). Broadbent and Zsoldos (2007) 
indicate that of the net total number of migrants flowing into the EU15, almost two-thirds 
have gone to Spain while the next two most important destination countries (in terms of 
absolute numbers) are Italy and the UK. At the same time, they indicate that France and 
Germany saw an inflow of relatively few migrants while the Netherlands saw a small net 
outflow leading up to 2005. Heinz and Ward-Warmedinger (2006) find for the European 
Union that the economic impacts of increased cross-border labour mobility are likely to be 
positive, although potentially unequally distributed across countries and sectors. 
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Figure 25. Net migration in the euro area and US 
(Millions of persons) 
Figure 26. EU-15 resident working age population by 
nationality and education level 



























Source: Eurostat, US Census/Office of Immigration Statistics. 
Note: Net migration is measured as the difference between the total 
population on 1 January and 31 December for a given calendar year minus 
the difference between births and deaths (or natural increase).Includes 
Metropolitan France until 1997. 
Source: European Commission (2006), based on Eurostat Labour Force 
Survey, Q1 2005, France and Austria Q2 2005. 
Note: Educational level: low (lower secondary), medium (upper 
secondary), high (tertiary). 
 
Turning to recent euro area wage developments, globalisation may have been one contributing 
factor to an extended period of wage moderation within the euro area (for instance, if 
offshoring or the threat of offshoring reduces the wage demands of workers). As indicated in 
Figure 27, real wages have been weaker than productivity both on aggregate and also within 
the manufacturing and services sectors – which can be considered as one of the central factors 
permitting the strong aggregate employment growth in the euro area in the decade leading up 
to 2006 indicated in Table 4. At the same time, there has been an ongoing weakening of the 
wage share of income for a longer period, which has been more severe than the corresponding 
fall in the US since the mid-80s, bringing this measure in both regions to historical lows 
(Figure 28). Arpaia et al. (2009) find that for several EU countries, most of the decline in 
wage shares is explained by technological forces: capital-augmenting technical progress and 
the assumption of capital-skill complementarity. Any conclusion that the fall in the wage 
share relates to the bargaining power of workers declining in the context of globalisation 
should be made with extreme caution given several caveats related to measurement issues
22 
and the fact that much of this decline took place well before the recent phase of globalisation. 
                                                 
22   It should be noted in this respect that several measurement problems limit the reliability of the wage share, including a 
growing importance of non-wage remuneration (particularly for the growing number of self employed), which imply that this 
measure cannot be interpreted reliably as the share of income accruing to capital or labour.    32
Moreover, globalisation’s contribution to an extended period of wage moderation within the 
euro area may very well have contributed to the strong job creation witnessed over the last 
decade as reported in Table 4.  
Figure 27. “Real” wages and productivity in the euro area 
(Average annual change between 1996 and 2007) 
Figure 28. Long-term developments in wage shares 
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Source: Eurostat (ESA95). 
Note: Real wages computed as nominal compensation per employee less 
the respective value added deflator. Services sum of (1) Trade, repairs, 
hotels, restaurants, transport and communications, (2) Financial, real 
estate, renting and business activities, and (3) Other service activities. 
Source: AMECO database and ECB calculations 
Note: Self-employment adjusted wage shares; total domestic economy. 
The wage share is defined as the ratio of total compensation of employees 
to gross national income at current market prices. 
Empirical evidence on the aggregate wage effects of globalisation suggest that an increase in 
the real wage elasticity of labour demand appears to have occurred in the last years, 
particularly for low-skilled workers, which may indicate a decline in the bargaining power of 
these groups (see, for instance, Pula and Skudelny (2009), as well as Price and Cournède 
(2007), Molnar et al. (2006), and Dumont et al. (2006)). The OECD (2007) finds that jobs and 
wages have become more vulnerable to external shocks – thereby possibly reducing the 
bargaining power of workers, especially low-skilled ones, which may therefore contribute to 
explain the falling share of wages in national income. Jaumotte et al (2008) as well as 
Jaumotte and Tytell (2007) point to only a minor role of globalisation in reducing the wage 
share compared with other factors such as technological change and labour market policies. 
They also find that countries that have enacted reforms to lower the cost of labour to business 
and improve labour market flexibility have generally experienced a smaller decline in the 
wage share. Concerning the question of whether the observed drop in the wage share of 
several advanced economies is structural or transitory, it would appear that there is not yet a   33
consensus in the literature. On the one hand, the findings of Guscina (2006) based on a panel 
of OECD countries (over the period 1960-2000) suggest that the decline in labour’s share 
during the past few decades may have been largely an equilibrium, rather than a cyclical, 
phenomenon, with technological progress having been capital-augmenting during the recent 
globalisation phase. On the other hand, other studies suggest that the observed fall in the wage 
share may be temporary (though possibly quite persistent), as while the wage share in income 
could match productivity over longer periods, a falling wage share could be evident at shorter 
horizons in the case of a relative decline in the return to labour given relatively more 
important frictions in adjusting the capital stock.
23 In addition to observable factors, an 
unobservable “threat effect” –whereby workers in industrialised economies perceive 
themselves to have a weaker bargaining position and thereby moderate wage claims given a 
fear of production relocation to lower-cost economies– may have contributed to the fall in the 
wage share.
24   
Leaving aside aggregate developments and looking more closely at uneven developments in 
employment and wages across skill groups, it would appear growing skill bias in labour 
demand in the euro area has manifested itself predominantly in hours (and not in hourly 
compensation). A review of the evolution of real wages and hours in the manufacturing sector 
by skill (proxied by level of educational attainment) yields two noteworthy findings.
25 First, a 
wedge has developed in euro area manufacturing hours, with a sustained rise in the hours of 
high-skilled workers contrasting with falling hours of low-skilled workers. Second, real wage 
developments have remained similar across all skill groups (Figure 29), thereby the skill bias 
in euro area labour demand has fallen predominantly on “quantities” (i.e. employment) and 
not “prices” (i.e. wages) – in contrast to the US, where wages appear to have exhibited more 
flexibility according to this skill classification.
26 At face value, this could suggest that labour 
market rigidities, for instance those preventing differentiated wage growth according to 
                                                 
23   As argued by Schumacher et al. (2007), while wages would be expected to adjust in response to any changes in productivity 
shocks in the short run, employment would be expected to adjust over medium-term horizons and the capital stock only in 
the long run given time-to-build constraints. In this vein, Ellis and Smith (2007) argue that a fall in factor income accruing to 
labour would be expected to result as long as the increase in the effective global supply of labour is not matched by an 
equivalent rise in the stock of capital.  
24   This could also imply a change in the equilibrium unemployment, or NAWRU, and also possibly some disconnect between 
product and labour market slack. 
25     It should be borne in mind that education-based skill classifications have some limitations, notably that they could be 
affected not only by the skill content of work, but also by changes in educational attainment patterns. 
26   Consistent with this, Hiebert and Vansteenkiste (2007) find for the US manufacturing sector that openness shocks produce 
relatively strong wage and productivity impacts relative to very limited employment impacts.    34
worker productivity, may imply a disproportionate adjustment in employment for a given shift 
in the wage elasticity of demand for lower-skilled groups.  
Figure 29.  Hours and real hourly wages by educational attainment-based measure of skill level 
(Index, 1996-100) 


































Source: ECB calculations based on EU Klems data 
Notes: Real wage index derived using PPI as deflator; derived from wage and hour shares in total by skill multiplied with levels available in KLEMS 
           Skill data derived from national data on educational attainment, with high skilled comprising those with university level education, and low skilled 
comprising those with primary and/ or secondary education (depending on the country). Hourly wages deflated using producer prices. 
Indeed, trade theory would suggest that enhanced trade between developed and developing 
countries places downward pressure on the relative returns to unskilled workers – whereby the 
relative real return to the factor used intensively in the production of a good whose relative 
price falls/rises should also fall/rise according to the Stolper-Samuelson proposition. This 
would also be consistent with changing euro area economic specialisation, based on 
comparative advantage, discussed in di Mauro and Anderton (2007) and Fontagne et al. 
(2007). Epifani and Gancia (2008) present a model indicating that international trade, even 
between identical countries, can raise the relative demand for skilled labour. Moreover, they 
argue that the scale of an economy can be a key determinant of the skill premium. While 
globalisation may play a role in skill biased labour demand, other factors such as skill-biased 
technological change or secular shifts of domestic production long-present in advanced 
economies (from manufacturing to services) may still play an important, and even dominant, 
role in this process.  
Examining prospective redistributive effects, there is empirical evidence of skill bias in labour 
demand (though the technology role is also of strong importance). As shown by Pula and 
Skudelny (2009), increased openness has a negative impact on labour demand for low skilled 
sectors, which they attribute to factors such as increased competition and offshoring and a   35
higher real wage elasticity of labour demand. Hijzen (2007) and Cuyvers et al. (2006) also 
indicate important differences in labour market developments for aggregate versus skill 
groups. In terms of the net effects across skill groups, Geishecker and Görg (2006) find on the 
basis of German micro data that the positive impact of outsourcing on high-skilled 
employment outweighs the negative impact on the low skilled. Anderton et al (2006) also find 
that technology –in the form of skill-biased technical change– is the main factor explaining 
the decline in the relative demand for less-skilled workers across a range of countries, but they 
also argue that the rapid rise in technological change seems to be partly driven by the strong 
growth in international trade and globalisation. Grossman and Rossi-Hansberg (2006) argue 
that a productivity effect associated with offshoring can more than offset labour supply and 
relative price effects, thereby leading to high wages for even low-skilled workers following a 
rise in offshoring (though Olsen (2006) finds little empirical evidence on the productivity 
effects of offshoring to date).  
While an important skill dimension appears to have been present in euro area labour market 
developments, there have been few signs of growing income inequality relative to a decade 
earlier on the basis of analysing the top and bottom quintiles of the income distribution, 
particularly by international standards – though such a finding is to some extent conditional 
on the specific measure of inequality used. As indicated in Figure 30, income inequality for 
the euro area had declined by 2005 to less than 95% of its 1995 level, when comparing the 
highest and lowest income quintiles (the 80/20 percentile ratio). A recent increase in 
inequality, however, appears to have occurred, which Bräuninger (2007) argues may reflect a 
rise in unemployment that occurred in the first half of the decade given an economic 
slowdown. On the basis of Gini coefficients, it would appear that in general income inequality 
in large euro area countries has generally increased since the early 80s (though considerable 
country heterogeneity is present), though generally remaining below either the US or the UK 
(Figure 31). For the US, Autor et al (2007) suggest that the changing distribution of job task 
demands, spurred directly by advancing information technology and indirectly by its impact 
on outsourcing, goes some distance toward interpreting the recent polarisation of the wage 
structure. Other factors may also be relevant, such as the possibility that wage earners are also 
capital owners, that government and private transfers mitigate the impact on overall 
inequality, and the emergence of non-wage components in wage bargaining (see for instance, 
Genre et al, 2004). As for income inequality, Harjes (2007), Cuyvers et al. (2002), and   36
Machin and van Reenen (1998) find only a modest contribution of international trade and 
immigration to euro area income inequality developments.  
Figure 30. Measure of income inequality in the euro 
area and the UK   (80/20 percentile ratio, index 1995=100) 
Figure 31. Gini coefficients from income distribution 




























Source: European Commission. 
Note: the ratio of total income received by the 20% of the population 
with the highest income (top quintile) to that received by the 20% of the 
population with the lowest income (lowest quintile). 
Source: Luxembourg Income Study 
Note: A high Gini coefficient indicates more unequal distribution, with zero 
corresponding to perfect equality and one corresponding to perfect 
inequality 
All in all, globalisation’s impacts on euro area labour markets have been mainly visible in the 
form of a redistribution of employment across sectoral, occupational and skill categories. 
Indeed, a review of available empirical evidence indicates that the aggregate labour market 
impacts of globalisation remain largely uncertain – with limited aggregate employment 
impacts contrasting with possibly more significant impacts on the wage share and bargaining 
power. That said, there appear to have been clear effects on certain sectors and skill groups, as 
the rise in offshoring which characterises the recent phase of globalisation appears to have 
been associated with a clear skill bias in labour demand.
27 As real wages across skill 
categories have shown little differentiation in response to this, labour market adjustment 
associated with such a bias in the euro area has been concentrated on employment. That said, 
there has been limited change in income inequality in the euro area when comparing with 
other advanced economies, such as the UK or US, thus far. Moreover, job losses associated 
with offshoring have been limited as a proportion of overall job losses in the euro area 
economy and, importantly, offset by employment gains elsewhere. In this vein, globalisation’s 
                                                 
27   More generally, the extent to which this can be attributed to globalisation (versus technology, for instance) in practice is 
uncertain – see the debate in the literature on the role of domestic versus global factors in producing labour market 
adjustment, for instance in Wood (1998).   37
contribution to an extended period of wage moderation within the euro area (for instance, 
through offshoring or the threat of offshoring) may very well have contributed to the strong 
job creation witnessed over the last decade. At the same time, the pronounced fall in the euro 
area wage share of income over the last decades appears to be linked not only to globalisation 
but to other possibly more relevant (though potentially related) factors such as technological 
and structural change.  
 
6  Globalisation and euro area prices 
 
Globalisation would be expected to have two main impacts on consumer price inflation in the 
short term –acknowledging that monetary policy determines inflation over the medium to long 
term– with the ultimate effect on prices remaining ambiguous as it depends on the interplay of 
various effects. First, a  relative price effect implies  that aggregate  inflation can be 
simultaneously attenuated by developments in some prices through global supply channels 
(for example, from dampened prices of imports of manufactured goods or cheaper inputs into 
the production process) and accentuated by increases in other prices given global demand 
pressures (for example, related to strong emerging market economies’ demand for energy and 
other commodities).
28 As relative price movements are a natural part of economic functioning 
and therefore need not necessarily have any effect on aggregate inflation consistent with a 
central bank’s inflation objective, such movements would only be expected to have short-term 
aggregate inflationary impacts insofar as the movements are sizeable and/or a combination of 
adjustment frictions and imperfect information imply prolonged impacts. Policy factors which 
could explain aggregate inflation impacts of relative price shocks could be monetary policy 
accommodation –either intentional, through an “opportunistic” approach to disinflation,
29 or 
unintentional, given imperfect information and learning– or asset price misalignments 
resulting from globalisation. Second, increased competitive pressures associated with 
globalisation could constitute an indirect channel affecting prices as they contribute to change 
price elasticities by compressing firms’ price-cost markups or cost developments, and thereby 
                                                 
28   Concerning the supply channels, a mechanical change in price dynamics derives from both a static level effect (a level shift 
in prices through the increasing shares of emerging markets in the import basket of advanced economies) and dynamic price 
differential effect (a change in inflation dynamics given inflation differentials between emerging and advanced economies in 
conjunction the change in import shares) – see ECB (2006b). 
29   For more on the opportunistic approach to disinflation, see Aksoya et al. (2006). As argued by Razin (2007), a flattening of 
the inflation-activity relationship induced by globalisation can induce the monetary authority guided in its policy by the 
welfare criterion of a representative household to put more emphasis on the reduction of inflation variability at the expense 
of an increase in the output gap variability.    38
exert a moderating influence on inflation as long as impediments to competition are not in 
place. In particular, increased competitive pressures would be expected to both dampen firm 
profit mark-up behaviour while also potentially altering developments in costs (such as the 
cost of capital and labour) which underlie price dynamics. While  changing firms’ mark-up 
behaviour, labour cost moderation and productivity enhancement may have implied more 
muted price inflation, such pressures may take time to materialise given what could be a 
gradual process of adjustment in price-setting for formerly protected industries along with 
frictions associated with the adjustment of production processes. In the context of a Phillips 
Curve framework, openness associated with globalisation may have contributed to change the 
link between consumer price inflation and costs or standard domestic measures of 
macroeconomic slack, in particular through competitive impacts on changing price flexibility 
or through an increasing role for foreign conditions in the price formation process. Indeed, 
globalisation may influence the Phillips curve in two key ways.
30 First, it may have affected 
the wage and price-setting behaviour of households and firms, thereby affecting the 
responsiveness of inflation to standard measures of economic slack or production costs. On 
one hand, this could imply a decreased responsiveness of domestic inflation to the domestic 
output gap in favour of slack in the global economy while on the other hand, heightened 
competition resulting from globalisation may have made prices and wages more responsive to 
economic activity in the long run (see, for instance, Rogoff, 2006). Second, globalisation 
might have changed the productive potential of the economy and therefore domestic slack 
itself, notably through productivity effects given competitive pressures and associated 
innovation.  
As referred to earlier, the recent euro area experience indicates that relative price impacts have 
been strong over the last decade, with disinflation in manufactured goods contrasting with a 
strong acceleration in prices for commodities. As indicated in Figure 32, producer prices over 
the last decade have been characterised by strong relative price effects, with muted 
development in consumer goods excluding food and tobacco along with capital goods relative 
to average producer prices contrasting with relatively strong increases in the energy 
component (which also may have affected prices further down the production chain). As 
indicated in Figure 33, HICP subcomponents have also exhibited sizeable price differentials, 
                                                 
30   More generally concerning Phillips Curve specifications, globalisation may have influenced the distribution and type of 
exogenous shocks to the inflation process (relating also to the relative price shocks described above), along with 
commensurate changes to observed inflation persistence and inflation expectations.   39
in particular with three energy-related items displaying the highest increases over 1996-2006, 
while three ICT-intensive internationally traded goods exhibit the lowest increases over the 
period. In particular, international trade dynamics may help to explain the extent of 
disinflation in manufacturing resulting from openness, with price impacts depending on the 
interplay between mechanical impacts from relative inflation differentials for existing euro 
area import shares (possibly mitigated by pricing-to-market considerations) and price level 
differentials leading to the mechanical disinflationary impact owing to further penetration of 
low cost countries into the euro area import basket. At the same time, commodity price 
volatility (in areas such as energy, minerals and food), in particular over 2008, may to some 
extent have been linked to globalisation forces.  
Figure 32. Producer prices: Evolution of selected sub-
indices relative to overall index 
(Change over 1996-2008 relative to overall index, %) 
Figure 33. Consumer prices: average price changes 
in euro area HICP subcomponents 
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Source: ECB calculations based on Eurostat data.  Source: ECB calculations based on Eurostat data. 
Note: Data for 92 HICP subcomponents. 
 
Studies examining trade globalisation’s aggregate impact on inflation tend to suggest a small 
net dampening impact of globalisation on prices through to around 2005, deriving from 
subdued price developments in the manufacturing sector. The overall dampening impact on 
euro area inflation appears to lie in the range of 0-0.3 percentage point per annum over the 5 
to 10 years leading up to around 2005 when taking into account the net impact of 
disinflationary effects of increased trade openness in the manufacturing sector and strong 
commodity price increases. On the basis of several; methodologies, including aggregate and 
sectoral analysis, the calculations by Pula and Skudelny (2009) indicate that a direct   40
dampening effect of import openness on euro area producer price inflation of 
0.1-1.0  percentage point for the manufacturing sector over the period 1996 to 2004. The 
authors report a dampening impact on euro area consumer price inflation of 0.05-0.2 
percentage point per year on average based on aggregate data over the same period on the 
basis of aggregate data. Pain et al. (2006) find a combined effect on consumer inflation from 
lower noncommodity import price inflation and higher commodity import price inflation of up 
to 0.3 percentage point per annum over the period 2000 to 2005. Using similar methodologies, 
Chen et al. (2007) and Helbling et al. (2006), and Glatzer et al. (2006) report findings of a 
similar magnitude for other countries and regional groupings. More recent calculations for the 
US suggest, however, that volatile commodity prices –and in particular leading up to the spike 
in mid-2008– pushed up import prices from China (Amiti and Davis, 2008). In general, 
empirical evidence would lend support to the idea of a strong relative price shock associated 
with globalisation.  
In contrast, evidence concerning the role of international competitive pressures in 
compressing firms’ mark-ups is mixed. On the one hand, theoretical models would predict 
pro-competitive effects contributing to reduce mark-ups as domestic firms compete with 
international firms. On the other hand, generally high profitability of firms in the period 
leading up to 2006 would suggest that there was little compression of profit mark-ups over 
this period at the aggregate level. Though pro-competitive effects from increased international 
competition may have helped hold down firms’ costs, on aggregate they appear to have had a 
more limited influence on firms’ pricing power. In the euro area, available data suggest that 
firms’ profit markups have not been compressed on aggregate in recent years (Figure 34), 
though such indicators are a crude proxy of unit profits. While growth in the profit markup 
weakened over the last decade compared with a decade earlier, with a fall in the growth of 
both labour costs and the value-added deflator, a closer look at sectoral developments leads to 
a more nuanced picture. An estimated measure of sectoral profit markups by Christopoulou 
and Vermeulen (2008) suggests that profit markups in the euro area over the period 1993-
2006 have been similar to or below those of the US in manufacturing but systematically 
higher in services (see Figure 35). Moreover, the findings of Chen et al. (2007) support the 
notion that markups have been compressed within the EU manufacturing sector, suggesting 
some compression of markups for firms producing tradable goods subject to international 
competition. Such findings could support the notion that markups have been compressed for   41
tradable goods subject to international competition, but have moved little in service industries 
which tend to be more sheltered from such forces – though such a conclusion must be 
tempered by measurement issues related, in particular, to service sector markups.   
Figure 34. Evolution of euro area value added deflator, 
ULC and profit markup 
(Period average of year-on-year growth rate, % ) 
Figure 35. Estimated sectoral mark-ups: Euro area 
versus US 












Average, 1985-95 Average, 1996-2006















Source: ECB Area-wide model database (see Fagan et al. (2005)). 
Note: Profit markup computed as annual growth rate of output price  less 
annual growth rate of unit labour costs. 
Source: Christopoulou and Vermeulen (2008). 
Note: Data for 48 two-digit industries (28 in manufacturing, 22 in services). 
A ratio greater than one implies that prices are larger than marginal costs 
and can be interpreted as evidence of market power in an industry. 
Empirical evidence suggests pro-competitive effects of trade have led to reduced markups in 
European manufacturing, with Chen et al. (2007) reporting a fall of markups in EU 
manufacturing by 1.6% over period 1988-2000. All in all, it appears that the aggregate 
economy impact has been muted – indeed, on aggregate price-cost markups have grown given 
the importance of other domestic factors (see Boulhol, 2004).  Abraham et al (2006), relying 
on microeconomic data for Belgium, find that price-cost margins are typically lower in sectors 
that are subject to higher international competition (especially from low-wage countries). 
Notwithstanding this finding of a limited compression of firm mark-ups, a flattening in the 
Phillips Curve appears to have occurred in the last decades, though it is not clear to what 
extent this reflects a growing influence of global or foreign measures of economic slack in the 
domestic inflation process. This development contrasts with theoretical arguments in favour 
of a steepening of the Phillips Curve in response to globalisation, as competitive forces make 
prices more flexible in response to changing costs or measures of economic slack (see, for 
instance, Rogoff, 2006 or Ball, 2006). In the euro area, a flattening in the inflation-
unemployment gap variant of the Phillips Curve has been evident over the last decades (see   42
Figure 36), though it should be kept in mind that changes in structural unemployment not 
captured by the simple measure of trend unemployment may have occurred over the period.
31 
Notwithstanding this caveat, while this latest flattening coincides with the acceleration of 
globalisation over the last decade, its contribution must be considered in the context of other 
factors such as the more efficient conduct of monetary policy, “good luck” (fewer negative 
macroeconomic or other shocks), fiscal discipline and structural reforms – though these policy 
factors themselves may very well have been affected by globalisation.  





































Source: ECB Area-wide model database (see Fagan et al. (2005)), September 2007 version. 
Note: Unemployment gap defined as the deviation of unemployment from trend unemployment 
measured by an HP filter with a smoothing parameter of 25,000. 
 
                                                 
31   This flattening is consistent with the development in other advanced economies – see, for instance, Bean (2007) for a 
discussion of the UK inflation-unemployment relationship.    43
There is limited evidence that domestic inflation has become more sensitive to measures of 
foreign slack in addition to the standard import price channel.
32 On the one hand, Borio and 
Filardo (2007) find a significant role for global economic slack measures in Phillips Curves of 
advanced economies (albeit with mixed results for the euro area). Specifically for the euro 
area, studies such as Paloviita (2007) and Rumler (2007) find euro area inflation dynamics are 
better captured by an open economy specification. In a similar vein, Ciccarelli and Mojon 
(2005) find that for several OECD countries, the global inflation rate moves largely in 
response to global real variables over short horizons and global monetary variables at longer 
horizons. In looking at inflation dynamics of highly disaggregated consumer price data, 
Monacelli and Sala (2007) find that a sizeable fraction of the variance of inflation explained 
by macroeconomic factors attributable to "international" factors for both Germany and 
France, but that such factors are more relevant in the goods/manufacturing sector than in the 
service sector. For the UK, Batini et al (2005) find that external competitive pressures also 
seem to affect inflation via their impact on the equilibrium price markup of domestic firms. 
On the other hand, many other studies have failed to identify a significant role for global 
economic slack measures in Phillips Curves of advanced economies. Calza (2008) finds 
limited evidence in support of the “global output gap hypothesis” for the euro area. This 
appears consistent with the findings of Musso et al. (2009), who find that a flattening of the 
slope of the euro area Phillips curve occurred mainly in the 1980s, before the current 
globalisation phase. Broadening the studies to those looking at other economic regions, Ball 
(2006), Woodford (2007), Ihrig et al. (2007) and Wynne and Kersting (2007) argue for a 
negligible role for measures of global economic slack on inflation dynamics, while Pain et al. 
(2006) relate a rise in the sensitivity to domestic inflation in OECD economies to foreign 
economic conditions to an import price channel alone. On the basis of a new Keynesian 
Phillips curve-based model, Sbordone (2008) finds it difficult to argue that an increase in 
trade would have generated a sufficiently large increase in U.S. market competition to reduce 
the slope of the inflation-marginal cost relation. 
All in all, globalisation appears to have had at best a small dampening effect on euro area 
prices on average over the 5 to 10 years leading up to around 2005 as strong relative price 
shocks associated with low prices of imports of manufactured goods through global supply 
                                                 
32   Globalisation may have weakened the link of domestic liquidity on domestic prices or, alternatively, implied a higher role for 
foreign liquidity in domestic prices; Rueffer and Stracca (2006) find that evidence of a significant spill-over of global 
liquidity to the euro area economy.    44
developments on balance offset strong increases in prices of hard commodities resulting from 
heightened global demand pressures over the period. In the period since that time, the balance 
of relative price shocks as characterised above could very well have been strongly inflationary 
at some stages. While a rise in international competitive pressures may have also contributed 
to wage moderation in the euro area, it appears to have led to little compression on overall 
profit mark-ups of firms. However, as in the case of productivity, exposure to international 
competition appears to have played an important role in sectoral mark-up developments. 
Beyond these effects, compelling evidence of a growing role for global measures of slack in 
the inflation process of the euro area and other advanced economies remains largely absent as 
a stand-alone factor – though, as argued by White (2008), may be one of several factors which 
combined to produce the observed flattening in the Phillips Curve slope.  
 
7 Conclusions   
 
This paper takes a long-term perspective over a period predominantly characterised by the 
rapid growth of globalisation, nothwithstanding the more recent interruption to the growth of 
global trade and capital flows that emerged towards the end of 2008 associated with the global 
financial turmoil and the downturn in global economic activity. Indeed, these recent events 
demonstrate how the increased international interconnectedness of financial and product 
markets exacerbated the financial turmoil that began in mid-2007, while the rapid growth in 
“vertical specialisation” and widespread global production chains associated with 
globalisation contributed to the subsequent highly synchronised nature of the downturn in 
global trade.   
However, the paper focuses on the longer-term trends and shows how globalisation has 
increased export competition in world markets over the past decade due to the emergence of 
new global trade players such as China, resulting in the shrinking of export market shares of 
advanced industrialised economies such as the euro area, while simultaneously stimulating 
world demand and euro area activity. The loss in share partly depends on how similar the 
export product specialisation of the euro area compares to these new competitors, with 
evidence showing that China is rapidly moving away from labour-intensive products and 
recently becoming similar to the euro area by increasing its specialisation in more research-
intensive goods. On the imports side, globalisation has been accompanied in the euro area by   45
a higher share of imports of manufactured goods from low-cost countries, which has resulted 
in stronger growth of extra-euro area imports relative to intra-euro area trade, while also 
putting downward pressure on import prices and inflationary pressures. Meanwhile, this 
downward pressure had been partly offset by higher demand for commodities from low-cost 
countries resulting in high commodity import prices – which had increased significantly up 
until the second half of 2008 prior to declining on average since that time in the context of the 
downturn in global economic activity.         
This paper then focussed on globalisation and its prospective role in shaping three broad areas 
of the euro area macroeconomy: productivity, the labour market, and prices. Notwithstanding 
difficulties in fully isolating globalisation from other important ongoing structural changes 
(such as changes in technology and policies), several key findings emerge. First, weak euro 
area productivity on aggregate over the last decade despite growing international openness has 
derived to a large extent from areas of the economy which are more sheltered from 
international competition, thereby hinting at a role for enhanced openness to such forces. 
Second, globalisation’s impacts on euro area labour markets have been mainly visible in the 
form of a redistribution of employment across sectoral, occupational and skill categories. The 
associated skill bias in labour demand has been concentrated on hours worked rather than 
wages, while there has been limited growth in income inequality in the euro area to date 
compared with other advanced economies. Gross job losses associated with offshoring have 
been limited as a proportion of overall job losses in the euro area economy and, importantly, 
offset by employment gains elsewhere – indeed, the strong net job creation witnessed over the 
last decade has benefited from the extended period of wage moderation to which globalisation 
has contributed. Third, increasing trade openness appears to have had a small dampening 
effect on euro area prices over the 5 to 10 years leading up to around 2005, as strong relative 
price shocks deriving from low prices of imported manufactured goods have on balance offset 
strong increases in prices of hard commodities resulting from heightened global demand 
pressures over the period. Apart from this influence on relative prices, globalisation appears to 
have had limited observed impacts as yet on either aggregate profit mark-ups of firms or the 
role of domestic slack in the inflation process of the euro area over this period. 
All in all, while the balance of empirical evidence suggests that globalisation alone may have 
had limited measurable direct aggregate impacts, its role in shaping domestic developments 
remains nonetheless significant for two reasons. First, globalisation appears to be having   46
strong effects in certain areas/sectors of the economy and therefore can entail considerable 
relative adjustments – including in some cases considerable redistributional effects at the 
household and firm level. This, of course, implies significant benefits for some cohorts as well 
as significant costs for others. In this respect, the aggregate economic impacts (or, for that 
matter, public perceptions) of globalisation depend crucially on the weighting scheme –either 
explicit or implicit– used to sum all redistributive impacts. Second, the phenomenon of 
globalisation is intertwined with several other ongoing structural changes, such as 
technological change and diffusion. Synthesising the international and domestic impacts of 
globalisation for the euro area, it appears that there would be a key role for macroeconomic 
policies in facilitating adjustment to globalisation and in reaping its potential benefits. 
Appropriate structural policies remain particularly important in both reducing frictions 
associated with adjustment while boosting the euro area’s productive potential. Three 
structural policy areas, in particular, are important. First and foremost, the prospective 
benefits of globalisation will only materialise insofar as policies foster global openness in 
goods, services and financial markets, and fight protectionism. Second, policies which 
facilitate smooth economic adjustment in a dynamic environment (e.g. an acceleration of 
structural reforms facilitating geographical and occupational mobility, wage flexibility, and 
competition and price flexibility in product markets) would help ease adjustment strains and 
associated distributional impacts, in particular those which have emerged in the euro area 
labour market. Third, policies which support an increase in the euro area’s competitiveness 
(e.g. policies fostering innovation and the adoption of new technologies, modern education 
systems supporting the upskilling of labour in line with technological advancements, and 
initiatives to create a business-friendly environment and to enhance the effectiveness of the 
public administration) could help address the weak euro area aggregate productivity growth 
witnessed to date, and create widespread gains for all households and firms. Monetary policy, 
of course, also has a role to play as it provides the solid foundations for efficient and 
beneficial adjustment – as is argued in Moutot and Vitale (2009).  In particular, a strong focus 
on domestic price stability facilitates efficient adjustment of the economy to relative price and 
other macroeconomic shocks associated with globalisation. 
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